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JURISDICTION OF T H E APPELLATE COURT
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann § 78-2-2(3)0,
accordingly the appellant filed a Notice of Appeal on December 8,1998, in the Third
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County to the Utah Supreme Court. By letter dated
April 13,1999, the Supreme Court poured-over authority in this case to the Court of
Appeals for disposition. See Utah Code Ann. §78.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

The trial court erred in finding that specific personal jurisdiction existed in this
case and that the defendant was subject to the long arm of the Utah courts
and the trial court should have dismissed the case.

II.

The trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, because the plaintiff was not
the real party in interest pursuant to Rule 17 U.R.C.P. nor was it a proper
party pursuant to §78-33-2 Utah Code Ann. and the trial court should have
dismissed the case.

III.

The trial court erred in mechanically adopting the findings of fact and
conclusions of law prepared and presented by counsel for the plaintiff.

IV.

The trial court's findings of facts are insufficient to support its conclusions of
law and therefore its rulings are a nullity. The trial court further erred in
ignoring and failing to rule upon this issue when it was raised by defendant in
its U.R.C.P. 60(b)(1) motion.
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STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW WITH SUPPORTING
AUTHORITY
In jurisdictional matters, this Court, "grant(s) no deference to the conclusions
of the trial court." Ross v. Schackel, 920 P. 2d 1159,1162 (Utah 1996). SII
Megadiamond, Inc. v. American Superabrasives Corp. 969 P.2d 430 (Utah 1998).
"An appeal from decision that presents only legal questions . . . reviewed for
correctness." Arguello v. Industrial Woodworking Machine Co., 838 P. 2d 1120,
1121 (Utah 1992); Stairways v, Curry, UTDk 980025 (Utah 1999). Further, in
cases involving review of Rule 60(b) U.R.C.P. where the issue is jurisdictional,
the standard of review is de novo, "if jurisdiction is lacking, the judgment
cannot stand without denying due process to the one against whom it runs."
Bonneville Billing v. Whatley, 949 P. 2d 768,771 (Utah App. 1997); Lund v. Hall,
938 P.2d 285 (Utah 1997). This issue was preserved on appeal in both of
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss with accompanying memoranda (I. 31-206
and I. 249-91).
Subject matter jurisdiction is the power and authority of the court to
determine a controversy and without which it cannot proceed." Thompson v.
Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230,1232 (Utah App. 1987). If a court acts beyond its
authority those acts are null and void. . . When a matter is outside the court's
jurisdiction it retains authority only to dismiss the action." Varian-Eimac, Inc.
v. Lamoreaux, 161 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah App. 1989). Rule 17(a) "contemplates
that the party bringing the suit has the capacity to sue, otherwise the suit is a
nullity." Estate ofMartin Haro v. Haro, 887 P.2d 878, 880 (Utah App. 1994).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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'We independently determine whether the appeal is proper when reviewing a
jurisdictional issue." Alfred v. Allred, 835 P.2d 974, 977 (Utah App. 1992).
Further, in cases involving review of Rule 60(b) U.R.C.P. where the issue is
jurisdictional, the standard of review is de novo, "if jurisdiction is lacking, the
judgment cannot stand without denying due process to the one against whom
it runs. Therefore, the propriety of the jurisdictional determination, becomes
a question of law upon which we do not defer to the trial court." Bonneville
Billing v. Whatley, 949 P.2d 768,771 (Utah App. 1997); "We accord no
deference to the trial court's conclusions of law but review them for
correctness." Lund v. Hall, 938 P.2d 285 (Utah 1997). This issue was
preserved on appeal in both of Defendant" s Motion to Dismiss with
accompanying memoranda (I. 31-206 and I. 249-91)1.
III.

"Utah's appellate courts look to the record and will affirm the findings if there
is 'no indication from the record . . . that the trial judge failed to adequately
deliberate and consider the merits of the case. Automatic Control Products Corp.
v. Tel-Tech, Inc. 780 P.2d 1258,1260. Findings of fact prepared by the court
"are drawn with the insight of a disinterested min" and are "more helpful to
the appellate court" than those prepared by counsel. United States v. El Paso
Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 656 (1964). It is for this reason that the federal
courts appear to have almost uniformly adopted the rule that while findings

1

In addition, plaintiff notes in its Memorandum in Opposition to Melvin's Motions
for Relief from Judgment or Order that defendant has raised this issue 11 times
before the trial court. (See footnote 6). (I. 597-617)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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prepared by counsel are sufficient under the federal analogue to U.R.C.P. 52,
appellate courts 'Svill feel freer in close cases to disregard a finding or remand
for further findings if the trial court did not prepare them him [or her] self." 9
Wright & Miller, at 707. See also, Ramsey Construction Co. v. Apache Tribe of
Mescalero Reservation, 616 F.2d 464 (10th Cir. 1980) Automatic Controls page
1264. This issue was not raised with the trial court because it did not become
relevant until after the trial court made its rulings. Defendant did file two post
trial Motions for Relief from the trial courfs Order, one claimed newly
discovered evidence and the other raised parts of this issue, e.g. that the trial
court had extended its order to cover Maryland even though Maryland law had
not been briefed for the court. The trial court ruled on the first post trial
motion, denying it, and ignored the second completely.
"It has long been the law in this state that conclusions of law must be
predicated upon and find support in the findings of fact and that the judgment
or decree must follow the conclusions of law." Gillmorv. Wright, 850 P.2d 431,
436 (Utah 1993). "Because a summary judgment resolves only questions of
law, we give no deference to the trial court* s determinations. We affirm only
if the decision before us was correct." Retherfordv. AT&T

Communications, 844

P.2d 949,958 (Utah 1992). As stated previously this issue was preserved in
the defendanf s Rule 60(b)(1) motion which was ignored by the trial court.
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES OF
CENTRAL IMPORTANCE
U.S. Constitution: Fourteenth Amendment
Section. 1. All persons bom or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Rule 17(a). Parties plaintiff and defendant. U.R.C.P.
(a) Real party in interest. Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest. An executor, administrator, guardian, bailee, trustee of an express
trust, a party with whom or in whose name a contract has been made for the benefit
of another, or a party authorized by statute may sue in that person's name without
joining the party for whose benefit the action is brought; and when a statute so
provides, an action for the use or benefit of another shall be brought in the name of
the state of Utah. No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted
in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after
objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or
substitution of, the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder, or substitution
shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the
real party in interest.
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Utah Code Ann. §78-33-2
Any person interested under a deed, will or written contract, or whose rights, status
or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or
franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under
the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of
rights, status or other legal relation thereunder.

Utah Code Ann, §78-51-32. Authority of attorneys and counselors.
An attorney and counselor has authority:
(1) to execute in the name of his client a bond or other written instrument
necessary and proper for the prosecution of an action or proceeding about to
be or already commenced, or for the prosecution or defense of any right
growing out of an action, proceeding or final judgment rendered therein.
(2) to bind his client in any of the steps of an action or proceeding by his
agreement filed with the clerk or entered upon the minutes of the court, and
not otherwise.
Utah Code Ann. §78-51-33. Proof of authority for appearance.
The court may on motion of either party and on the showing of reasonable grounds
therefor require the attorney for the adverse party, or for any one of several adverse
parties, to produce or prove by his own oath or otherwise the authority under
which he appears, and until he does so may stay all proceedings by him on behalf of
the parties for whom he assumes to appear.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, 6
may contain errors.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
David Melvin, a legal resident of the State of Maryland and a citizen of the
United Kingdom, the appellant/defendant (hereinafter defendant) was employed by
the Franklin Covey Company, Inc. (FCQ from January, 1992, until September 12,
1997. (Federal court filing, Response to Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to
Dismiss— Index - hereinafter I. - 31-206)2. FCC. terminated the defendant in
August, 1997, effective as of September 12,1997. Subsequendy, the defendant sent a
demand letter to the FCC. which was received by that company on February 8,1998.
(1.1-13). FCC never responded to that demand letter. Instead, plaintiff Franklin
Covey Client Sales, Inc. (FCCS) filed its complaint in the Third Judicial District
Court, Salt Lake County, Utah seeking Declaratory Relief on February 13th . (I. 1-13).
The defendant" s first notice of this action was by service of a summons upon him at
his home in Silver Spring, Maryland on February 14th . (I. 14-15; I. 207-210). The
Defendant filed a Notice of Removal to U.S District Court, State of Utah on March
9th and the plaintiff filed a Motion for Remand on March 17th .3 (I. 31-206).
Subsequently, defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss on March 24,1998, alleging lack

2

All references to the record, pursuant to Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, are made based upon the Court of Appeal Index which was faxed to the
appellant by the Clerk of this Court, since Appellant has no access to the original
documentation in Utah.
3
Throughout this entire period defendant was pro se until Maryland counsel was
admitted Pro Hac Vice on October 30,1998.
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7
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of personal jurisdiction and the fact that the plaintiff was not a proper party pursuant
to U.R.C.P. 17(a). (I. 31-206). On April 10,1998, plaintiff filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment. Plaintiff filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction or to Change Venue on April 13,
1998. (L 31-206). On May 13,1998 an Order granting Plaintiffs Motion for Remand
was filed by Judge Dee V. Benson, U.S. District Court for the District of Utah,
Central Division. (I. 31-206).
Plaintiff then filed a Notice to Submit for Decision or Hearing on May 19th .
(I. 211-216). Defendant filed his Opposition to Summary Judgment on May 29th (I.
224-43) and plaintiff filed its Reply on June 9th . (I. 295-305). In June, 1998, venue
was changed from U.S.D.C. to Utah 3 rd District Court. (I. 244-7).
Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss before Judge Young, Third Judicial
District Court, on June 3 rd alleging, as it had in its previous motion, that the court
lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant and that the plaintiff was not a real
party at interest nor did privity exist between the parties. It further alleged that
Declaratory Relief was inappropriate, as material issues were in dispute and requested
postponement of any hearing until after discovery. (I. 249-91). On June 9 th , plaintiff
filed a document entitled "Franklin Covey Co. Consent to be Bound," signed by
plaintiffs counsel (but unsigned by any FCC representative), which purported to be
an assignment of FCC s rights to pursue this matter to FCCS. (I. 292-4). Further, on
June 9 th , Plaintiff sent defendant a Notice of Hearing scheduling a hearing for Friday,
June 19th in Judge Young's courtroom. (I. 306-7). On June 10th, defendant filed a

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Motion to Continue the Hearing Date informing the court that he resided in
Maryland, that said date chosen unilaterally by plaintiffs counsel conflicted with prior
work commitments of the defendant, and requested, pursuant to Rule 4-501(5), Utah
Code of Judicial Administration to participate by telephone. (I. 327-30)4. By letter
dated June 15 th , to plaintiffs counsel, defendant reviewed these issues and the
fundamental unfairness pertaining thereto as well suggesting that the hearing be
continued until after the completion of discovery. (I. 320-3). On June 15th plaintiff
filed an Amended Notice of Hearing, scheduling a hearing for Friday, June 26th in
Utah. (I. 314-6). Plaintiff filed a Motion to Strike the second Motion to Dismiss on
June 16th. (I. 317-9). Defendant filed his response to the Motion to Strike on June
23 rd . (I. 371-5). On June 23 rd , plaintiff filed a Notice to Submit for Decision (I. 3579) as well as a Request for a Consolidated Hearing. (I. 354-6). On June 23 rd ,
defendant filed a Motion to Stay, noting that a decision could be rendered without a
hearing — since only the defendant had filed sworn affidavits which were unanswered
by plaintiff (who had chosen to rely on misstating the contents of defendant's
affidavits, rather than file any sworn affidavits supporting its contentions), with the
remaining evidence before the court documentary. The defendant requested that the
court choose to rule without holding a hearing (if his request for postponement was
denied), noting (a) the hardships posed by his attendance at a hearing in Utah; (b) that

4

Unlike any other court in which counsel has practiced, the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure do not place any requirements on the district court to notify the parties of
rulings made and/or filed. D e f e n d a n t , ^ se and residing 2000 miles from the
courthouse, was placed under a constant disadvantage in terms of finding out

9
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plaintiff had waived its right to a hearing though lack of compliance with Rule 4501(b)(3) Utah Code of Judicial Administration requiring that a hearing request be
filed with a part/s principal memorandum; (c) the lack of any communication with
the defendant by the court; (d) the irreparable harm that would be caused by
requiring the defendant to defend himself at a hearing over 2000 miles from his
home, on short notice without adequate time to prepare; and, (e) reiterating
defendant's request to participate by telephone. (I. 360-70).
Judge Young failed to rule on any of these motions. Instead on June 26 th , a
hearing was held in Utah before Judge Young without the presence of the defendant,
(while plaintiffs counsel was present he presented no evidence nor called any
witnesses) in which, unsurprisingly (based on these facts), Judge Young granted both
plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion for Declaratory Judgment. On
July 9th the Index reflects that an Order was filed (I. 392). As Defendant never
received a copy of this Order, its contents are unknown. On July 14th, defendant filed
Objections to plaintiff s proposed Order. (I. 395-7). On July 14th the Order granting
Summary Judgment was signed. (I. 393-394). (The Order granting Summary
Judgment has a written notation "7/14/98, objections denied.") On July 21 st ,
defendant filed objections to plaintiff s proposed Order regarding Declaratory
Judgment. (I. 398-402). On July 27th the Order granting Declaratory Judgment was
filed. (Defendant's objections were never ruled upon.) (I. 410-412). On July 27th and
again on the 29 th , Defendant filed Motions for Extension of Time, requesting

information on the status of the case. Phone calls were not returned and requests for
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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additional time to file Motions for Reconsideration due to newly discovered evidence.
In his motions defendant alleged recent newly discovered evidence which supported
his contention that FCCS was not the real party in interest. "Unfortunately, the
person who possesses this information is currently outside of the continental U.S.
and will not return until late July," thus necessitating a short delay (I. 413-9). Judge
Young never responded to these motions, although the record indicates that an
unsigned Order was filed on August 10th . (I. 420-23). (Defendant never received a
copy of the Order nor is he aware of its contents.)
Defendant did not learn of the entry of the Declaratory Judgment Order until
August 28th. The pertinent facts were contained in an affidavit submitted as an
attachment to defendant's Motion for Extension of Time for Appeal: (I. 426-9)
a.

The pro se defendant in the case of Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v.
David Melvin, in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County,
State of Utah states under the penalties of perjury that:

b.

I am also the plaintiff in the case of Melvin v. Franklin Covey Co. and
Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc., filed in the U.S. District Court for
Maryland, Greenbelt Division, in which I was represented by Mark
Hessel, Esq. of Maryland.

c.

In late July, 1998,1 informed Mr. Hessel that my family and I would be
out of the state of Maryland for most of the month of August on
family and related matters and expressed my concern about keeping

information were frequently ignored.
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abreast of the Utah case. We discussed the best way for me to do so,
and, Mr. Hessel agreed to serve as intermediary during my absence. I
was present, in Mr. Hessel's office, when he phoned Steven Bednar,
attorney for the plaintiff, and heard him explain to Mr. Bednar as we
would be absent from Maryland for most of August, he, Mr. Hessel,
had agreed to serve as a point of contact for all mail and/or other
matters related to the Utah case. I then provided Mr. Hessel with a
contact number where I could be reached and confirmed with Mr.
Hessel that I would regularly (at least once per day) check our
Maryland voice mail.
d.

During our absence , my wife and I checked our Maryland voicemail at
least once per day but received no messages from Mr. Hessel. I also
called Mr. Hessel's office 2-3 times per week every week. In most
instances I got his voicemail and left a message. On two occasions I
spoke with Mr. Hessel. During the first, prior to August 13, Mr.
Hessel informed me that Mr. Bednar had contacted him about Mr.
Hessel's status in the Utah case. Mr. Hessel told me he had written a
letter to Mr. Bednar confirming that he was not representing me in the
Utah case but simply serving as point of contact for communications
during August. For the next 2 weeks I left several messages for Mr.
Hessel but received no return calls. On August 28,1998,1 spoke to
Mr. Hessel. At that time he informed me that he had "a letter on his

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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desk dated August 13,1998" from Mr. Bednar which he had received
on August 16,1998. When asked what the letter said, Mr. Hessel
replied, "I don't know, I haven't read it," and proceeded to read it to
me.. Mr. Bednar's letter informed me contained the information that
Judge Young had granted Declaratory Judgment on July 27 t h .. When I
asked Mr. Hessel why he had not informed me of this previously, he
offered no response or explanation. Subsequent inquiries made to Mr.
Hessel have been no more productive and he no longer serves as our
family^ s personal attorney.
While Mr. Hessel's actions were unfortunate, they were also totally
unforseeable.
Upon learning of the existence of Mr. Bednai^s letter and Order, I
immediately obtained copies from Mr. Hessel the next day. Upon
receipt I took the following actions:
I immediately filed a notice of appeal5.
I wrote to Mr. Bednar explaining the situation." Defendant also
immediately called plaintiffs counsel, and explained the situation.
Foolishly, as it turned out, defendant requested that the parties work
something out so that defendant wasn't prejudiced unfairly. Plaintiff s
counsel turned down the request for an amicable resolution and chose
to press the unfortunate circumstances to its full advantage. (See
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Appellant's Motion to Stay filed with the Utah Supreme Court,
November 5,1998.)
Defendant also filed a number of motions with the trial court seeking relief
from its judgment raising the issues that are raised in this appeal, (I. 502-550), all of
which were opposed by the plaintiff. (I. 564-96). Plaintiff filed a Motion for
Summary Disposition with the Supreme Court based on the untimely filing of the
defendant's appeal which was granted on December 9th .
Judge Young signed an Order admitting defendant's Maryland counsel ProHac
Vice on October 26th . (I. 628-30). On November 10th Judge Young issued an
opinion denying all of the defendant's post trial motions. (I. 662-666). The instant
appeal from that opinion was filed on December 8,1999. (I. 667-76). On January 12,
1999, plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Disposition which was "deferred/denied"
by the Utah Supreme Court on February 9th. The Court further stated "(T]he parties
are asked to include the jurisdictional issue in their briefs." (See Attachment A). On
April 13 th the Utah Supreme Court transferred jurisdiction to this Court.
S T A T E M E N T O F FACTS
Defendant, a resident of Maryland and citizen of the United Kingdom, was an
employee of Franklin International, Europe, a division of Franklin International
Institute, Inc. (a predecessor to FCC) in the U.K. as an Account Executive and
training consultant. He was employed in this capacity from January, 1992, until July,
1995. As that time he was consistently ranked number one in productivity. (See

5

While the Notice of Appeal was mailed to the Clerk of Court the next day,
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Response Memorandum to Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, - hereinafter Response
Memorandum - Defendant's Attached Supplemental Declaration, I. 31-206)6 FCC,
is an international professional services and leadership development company with
over 4,200 employees (as of August 31,1998), with total sales of $546,612,000 (again
as of 08/31/98). FCC is incorporated in Utah where its corporate headquarters are
located. (Company Annual Report, 1998). FCC maintains 10 regional offices based
around the globe serving organizations and individuals in more than 30 countries.
(Company Annual Report, 1998). FCC owns considerable real estate in Utah, and
maintains sales, administrative and warehouse facilities in or near, Salt Lake City;
Phoenix; Atlanta; Washington D.C. and, at least 16 locations overseas. (Company
Annual Report, 1998).
In 1995, after several years of successful employment with FCC, the
defendant, for personal reasons, decided to relocate to the state of Maryland and
applied for an intra company transfer to the Shipley Division of FCC in the U.S. On
May 31,1995, defendant signed a letter of agreement in Maryland offering him a job
in the U.S. dated May 9 th , signed by John Harding, Senior Vice President, Shipley
Associates, a division of Franklin Quest (later Franklin Covey) in which he was
offered a position as an account executive for the Central Atlantic States with Shipley
Associates, a division of FCC. (See Response Memorandum, Defendanf s Attached
Supplemental Declaration, I. 31-206). He began work on July 5,1995. His place of

inexplicably the appeal was not docketed until September 11,1998.
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employment, provided by FCC was an office suite located at 200 Orchard Ridge
Drive, Gaithersburg, Maryland in which 5 other individuals also employed by FCC
were assigned to sell different FCC products. (See Response Memorandum,
Defendant's Attached Declaration, I. 31-206). When he commenced employment he
was given responsibility for sales in the Central Atlantic States in the Eastern Region
of the U.S. His territory included New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, West Virginia and the District of Columbia. As an Account Executive,
Melvin was responsible for selling a line of FCC s products and services including
writing and presentation training and consulting services in the Eastern United States
and Europe. (See Response Memorandum, Defendant" s Attached Declaration, I. 31206). At no time was the defendant given responsibility for sales in Utah. (See
Response Memorandum, Defendant's Attached Declaration, I. 31-206). Further,
Melvin has never resided in Utah. Has no bank account or other financial ties of any
kind to Utah. Owns no property in Utah. Pays no taxes in Utah and has no other
connection to the state other than the fact he was employed by a company that was
headquartered in Utah for a period of years. During his entire tenure with FCC,
Melvin made 10 trips almost all consisting of a few days. As listed in his affidavit 9 of
the 10 trips were at FCCs behest for conferences or trainings he was required to
attend in order to keep his job.. Of the 10 trips, only 5 are relevant to this proceeding
as they were the only ones that occurred after Melvin moved to the U.S. and assumed

6

For the Courf s convenience both affidavits in this section are included in the
addendum the Defendant" s Declaration is Attachment B and the Supplemental
Statement is Attachment C.
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employment in Maryland. The 10th trip, for one day on May 30,1997, was made at
the request of FCC for a meeting to be held in Utah, at FCCs insistence, with a
former client of Melvin's from the U.K., GEC. (GEC is not a Utah company nor
does it maintain a presence in Utah. (See Response Memorandum, Defendant* s
Attached Declaration, I. 31-206). "Since I knew GEC from when I worked in the
U.K., I was asked by Franklin to help its sales staff in Utah understand GEC needs. I
attended because FCC requested it. I did not receive any compensation for this trip
(although his only compensation at that time was straight commission - thereby
depriving Melvin of his ability to earn a livelihood during that period of time.) I did
not attempt to sell products or services to GEC in Utah and no sale resulted in Utah
at that time." Melvin never received compensation either for the time he expended or
his efforts on behalf of FCC. Nor did he receive any commission on any resulting
sales. (See Response Memorandum, Defendant's Attached Declaration, I. 31-206).
It is upon this extremely slender thread that the plaintiff attempts to deny that it has
overreached and to support its claim of specific personal jurisdiction in the Utah.
FCC sponsored Melvin's application for a work status visa with the U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service stating that his job description was as
a"strategic business communications account/channel manager in the Eastern United
States and Europe," and the appropriate visas were issued. (See Response
Memorandum, Attachment D, L 31-206). Melvin worked for the company selling its
products to customers in his assigned "Eastern Region" in and around Maryland for
a period of approximately two years when he was summarily fired on March 31,1997.
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(See Response Memorandum, Attachment A, Dismissal Letter I. 31-206). At no time
prior to plaintiffs discharge had he received any negative comments about his job
performance. (See Motion to Dismiss, Attachment A, Letter of Congratulations from
President and CEO of Franklin Quest. I. 31-206).
After Melvin was terminated, he approached management and asked them to
reconsider their decision. He needed the job because his INS Work Visa was only
valid if he worked for FCC. After a number of conversations and proposals by
Melvin, FCC agreed to rehire Melvin with a substantially different salary structure
which was highly detrimental to Melvin and highly beneficial to FCC. (See Response
Memorandum, Defendant* s Attached Supplemental Declaration, I. 31-206). One
element of this contract contained the phrase "according to FCC policy, commissions
are paid only for those services delivered while you are employed by Franklin."
Melvin signed believing, as detailed in his affidavit, 1) that the "services" referred to
Melvin's services to FCC, and; 2) that, based upon his previous knowledge of other
former employees with the FCC, this provision would only apply in the case of
voluntary departure. (See Supplemental Statement; Opposition to Summary
Judgment I. 224-43). Subsequently, after a period of approximately five and one half
months, during which Melvin received regular positive feedback about his
performance (including such comments as one senior manager* s "high regard for
Melvin" and that Melvin was a "class act,"), and after receiving assurances that he
"would be made whole" in September, 1997, and complying with requests to perform
additional (uncompensated) work (partly described above) outside the scope of the
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letter of agreement or anticipated employment, he was again summarily fired in
August, 1997 at the airport by phone as he was about to board an airplane for a
company requested trip to Utah. (See Response Memorandum, Defendant's Attached
Supplemental Declaration, I. 31-206). In fact, FCC employees deliberately continued
to "string Melvin along" with a variety of promises to lull him into believing that it
would make good on its ultimate process to "make him whole" while continuing to
take advantage of his talents and services at bargain basement rates. (See Response
Memorandum, Defendanfs Attached Supplemental Declaration, I. 31-206). When
FCC terminated Melvin, it made no offer to compensate him for either work
completed by him to date, goods or services sold by him to date, or services rendered
to date that led to additional revenues for the company. In fact, it waffled about the
date of termination during which time Melvin continued to service FCC clients in
order to provide continuity of service. No compensation was offered by FCC (or
ever provided) for this service either. (See Response Memorandum, Supplemental
Statement, I. 31-206). Melvin applied to his former employer for compensation owed
him. The only response was from a current FCC employee, who had been given
Melvin's accounts, and who continually called begging Melvin's assistance (for free) in
servicing these accounts. When Melvin requested compensation for these requested
efforts he was turned down. (See Response Memorandum, Supplemental Statement,
I. 31-206). Finally, Melvin sought legal counsel in Maryland. Prolonged negotiations
were required just to obtain his personnel file which contained gross inadequacies,
including a notation that he had "resigned" from the company for "other
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employment," rather than the truth that he was terminated. . (See Response
Memorandum, Attached Declaration and Supplemental Statement, I. 31-206; Motion
to Dismiss, Attachment 1,1. 249-91). Only after threatening litigation was an offer of
compensation forthcoming however strings were attached. Before FCC would
release the monies it lawfully owed to Melvin and was withholding, it wanted a release
signed by Melvin. Melvin rejected the global release provided by FCC, and instead,
signed a much narrower release, drafted by his Maryland attorney. (See
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Attachment C, 31-206).
This release only released FCC from commissions for sales completed (meaning
delivered by FCC to the client) before Melvin's termination. It does not cover
services and products that were also within Melvin's job requirements and for which
monies are owed to him. Nor does it cover services completed by Melvin before his
termination, that led to income for FCC after Melvin's termination. While FCC's
part of the performance bargain may not have been complete, Melvin had completed
his part of the process and had successfully provided the services that were within his
job purview. (1.224-43). This release was accepted by FCC who then paid the
compensation. Subsequently, Melvin, through his Maryland attorney sent a demand
letter to FCC's general counsel at FCC corporate headquarters in Utah requesting
compensation for a variety of other compensation not covered by the release or the
compensation previously paid. The demand letter included a period of time during
which Melvin would refrain from taking further action in order for Melvin and his
employer to find a mutually satisfactory solution without resort to litigation. (I. 224-
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43, Attachment B). In response, in less than 1 week from FCCs receipt of this
letter, Melvin was served with a summons and complaint at his Maryland home on a
weekend, by FCCS, claiming to be his employer and requesting declaratory judgment
in Utah. (See Response Memorandum, Supplemental Statement, I. 31-206). Melvin,
as he has repeatedly made clear to the trial court judge, (See Response Memorandum,
Attached Declaration, Supplemental Statement, L 31-206; Motion to Dismiss,
Attachment 1,1. 249-91), had never heard of FCCS, had had no prior contact with
FCCS, nor knew of any privity that ever existed between them. In response, rather
than amending its complaint as permitted by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
FCCS filed a dubious document entitled "Consent to be Bound by Judgment and
Assignment" signed by counsel for FCCS on behalf of FCC (I. 292-92) purporting to
"assign any rights which may be necessary, (if any) to entide Plaintiff to prosecute
this action as the real-party-in-interest." The only evidence ever presented by the
plaintiff to support this contention was a W-2 issued to Melvin by FCCS (for the
fiscal year 1997). This form was issued in 1998, several months after Melvin had
been terminated. (I. 597-617, Exhibit D). It is by this additional slender thread that
FCCS hangs its hopes on establishing subject matter jurisdiction. Only after the trial
court had issued the Declaratory Judgment Order and defendand had filed a post trial
motion requesting relief from the Order did the plaintiff for the first time put forth
the novel argument that the "Consent to be Bound" (though previously offered for
its probative value) was now "not an actual assignment but merely notice to the court
that an assignment (which was never entered into evidence) had occurred. (I. 597-
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617). In this same post trial document, plaintiffs counsel, for the first time, entered a
document actually signed by officers of FCC rather than counsel for the plaintiff,
neither dated (therefore impossible to tell when actually executed), nor under oath,
alleging it to be the actual assignment. The employer was not a party to the suit.
Further, to Melvin's knowledge, counsel for the FCCS has never filed an appearance
with the trial court in which the said employer acknowledges counsel for FCCS is also
FCC's counsel, with the right to act on its behalf. [See Utah Code Ann. §78-51-32
(2)]. In fact Melvin later discovered that in unrelated litigation in California, counsel
for FCC was maintaining a position in direct contradiction to that maintained by
counsel for FCCS in the instant case. In his Motion for Post Trial Relief, Melvin
provided the court with a copy of a pleading in a California case in which FCC was
the defendant and in which case FCC took a contradictory position before the
California court than the one taken here. (Memorandum for Relief from Judgment
or Order, Attachment B, 523-546). This was first brought to the court's attention on
July 27,1997. (Defendant's Motion for Extension of Time, I. 413-9). Nevertheless,
FCCS was granted first Summary Judgment on July 14,1998 and later Declaratory
Judgment on July 27,1998, the Declaratory Judgment purporting to provide relief
both under Utah and Maryland law. (I. 393-4 and 410-2). The trial Court's findings
mirror exactly the proposed findings propounded by the plaintiff. (Compare
Attachments A and B to I. 393-4, and 410-2). For example, the trial court* s Order
extended its findings to include the State of Maryland even though Maryland case law
was neither briefed nor argued to the court. However, this extension to the state of
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Maryland was included in the proposed findings propounded to the trial court by the
plaintiff which the trial court mechanically adopted.
In addition, a review of the only transcript regarding this matter indicates that
the trial court was confused as to the facts and misunderstood and misstated on the
record Melvins's ties to Utah which formed the basis for its finding that in personam
jurisdiction existed, stating:
"The Court: Remind me of the jurisdictional issue.
Mr. Bednar: Mr. Melvin contends that he is not subject to personal
jurisdiction in Utah.
The Court: Don't your underlying contracts originate in Utah and are they
subject to interpretation by Utah courts?"
Mr. Bednar: The letter agreement that determines his compensation does not
have a choice of law or venue provision. Our basis for sustaining personal
jurisdiction is that Mr. Melvin in his complaint in Maryland alleges that he came here
to Utah, that he conducted business here by attempting to recruit clients and he is
seeking compensation (sic) that very activity, and that, therefore, specific person
jurisdiction does exist. But it may be wise to make a ruling on that motion.
The Court: All right The court finds that there is personal jurisdiction in the
case." (Transcript I. 686 at page 6). The trial judge having misinterpreted completely
the defendanfs pleadings, and having been mislead as to the defendanf s actual
contacts with Utah, inquired no further and agreed to have plaintiffs counsel draft
Orders for both motions. The legal battle that followed is fully set forth above.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
L

Lack of Personal Jurisdiction.
A.

Defendant lacked the minimum contacts necessary to support
jurisdiction under the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due
process.

B.

The facts fail to support a finding that the defendant purposefully
directed his activities to residents of Utah or that the instant litigation
arises out of defendant* s contacts to Utah.

C.

Melvin never conducted business in Utah or any other activities that
would allow him to invoke the protections or benefits of the Utah
courts.

D.

Melvin's employment contract does not form the basis for plaintiff s
personal jurisdiction claim as there is no nexus between it and
defendanf s activities in Utah.

E.

Plaintiff failed to meet its burden to establish personal jurisdiction
when its general allegations of jurisdiction were countered by
defendanf s sworn affidavit countering those general allegations and
plaintiff failed to provide anything more.

F.

On the present facts subjecting the defendant to personal jurisdiction
in Utah would offend traditional concepts of fair play and substantial
justice.
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G.

To find Melvin subject to the jurisdiction of the Utah courts would
make the litigation so gravely difficult and inconvenient for him that he
would be severely disadvantaged and denied due process.

H.

The remedial purposes of the long arm statute would not be promoted
by finding that personal jurisdiction exists in the instant case.

II.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
A.

Plaintiff was not the "real party in interest" pursuant to Rule 17(a)
U.R.C.P., nor did privity exist between the plaintiff and defendant and
thus the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.

B.

Parents corporations and their subsidiaries are separate and distinct
legal entities, each with their own bound by their individual obligations
and benefits.

C

The "Consent to be Bound" was a document of dubious probative
value, if any, that could not cure plaintiffs defective complaint.

D.

Where the plaintiff s status as "real party in interest" depends upon an
assignment, plaintiff has the burden of proving its status as an assignee,
which plaintiff failed to do in this case.

E.

Plaintiff had the further burden of proving that the defendant had
received adequate legal notice of the assignment which it failed to do.

F.

Plaintiff chose this dubious course of action to maintain its status as
first in the race to the courthouse and its actions should not be
condoned by this Court.
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G.

Allowing such actions as those taken by the plaintiff would make it
possible for a subsidiary of any giant corporation to sue an employee of
the parent company in a locale inconvenient to the employee, but
convenient to the subsidiary, on issues related to the employment
issues between the parent and the employee even though the subsidiary
has no relationship to the employee.

III.

Mechanical Adoption.
A.

The record supports a finding that the trial court mechanically adopted
the findings of fact and conclusions of law prepared and presented by
counsel for the plaintiff, as the courfs Orders exactly mirror those
submitted by plaintiff.

B.

The court ruled from the bench on suggestion of plaintiff s counsel,
even though it had demonstrated its lack of knowledge regarding at
least one of the issues and had been misinformed by plaintiff s counsel,
and then at plaintiffs counsel's suggestion agreed to his preparation of
the courf s Orders.

C.

The court signed a ruling that was manifestly incorrect.

D.

There is nothing in the record that indicates the indicia normally
accepted by this Court diat the trial court adequately, disinterestedly or
independently considered the merits of the case.

IV.

Insufficient Findings of Fact to Support Conclusions of Law.
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A.

The declarations adjudged by the court in the Declaratory Judgment
Order are beyond the scope and not supported by the findings of fact
set forth in the trial court* s Summary Judgment Order.

B.

To allow the trial court to impose speculation on the adjudicatory
process violates the basic premises of our judicial system and denies at
least one side the fair and impartial hearing and adjudication of his
affairs to which is his right.
ARGUMENTS

I.

Personal Jurisdiction.
Plaintiff has previously conceded that defendant* s contacts do not support a

finding of general personal jurisdiction. Moreover, of the three bases for finding
specific personal jurisdiction under the long arm statute, plaintiff relies only on the
allegation that Melvin transacted business in Utah. Its has never argued that Melvin
contracted to supply goods and services in Utah or that he cause injury within the
state. (See plaintiff s Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss.) Under the
facts presented in this case, Melvin did not transact business in Utah as defined by
the long arm statute and lacked sufficient minimum contacts to support jurisdiction
under the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process of law. The Supreme
Court of Utah has recognized that process served pursuant to a long arm statute is
not valid or effective to subject a non-resident to in personam jurisdiction unless the
defendant unless the defendant "purposefully established minimum contact with the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
27 may contain errors.
Machine-generated OCR,

forum state" and the defendant "should reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there/ 5 Bradford v. Nagle, 763 P.2d 791,794 (Utah 1988).
The Utah Courts have taken the position that if the set of circumstances
satisfies Fourteenth Amendment due process constitutional muster, and does not
violate its requirements of "fair warning that a particular activity may subject them to
the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign," Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) or
"notions of fair play and substantial justice," International Shoe V. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 317 (1945) then the requirements of the long arm statute are also satisfied so
long as the claims against the nonresident defendant arise from activities enumerated
in Utah's long arm statute. Kandarv. LaRay Company, 815 P.2d 245 (Utah App. 1991).
Here the plaintiffs assertion of personal jurisdiction fails on several grounds.
"Where a forum seeks to assert specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state
resident who has not consented to suit there, this fair warning requirement is satisfied
if the defendant "purposefully directed his activities at residents of the forum, and the
litigation results from alleged injuries that "arise out of or related to" those activities.
Burger King Corp. v. Rud^ewic^ Al\ U.S. 462,472 (1985); Accord, Synergetics v. Marathon
Ranching Co., 701 P.2d 1106,1100 (Utah 1985) (did the defendant purposefully avail
himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking
the benefits and protections of its laws?)
There is no allegation nor can one be supported that Melvin directed his activities
to Utah residents. In fact, his contract, specifically engages him to direct his activities to
clients and potential clients in the Eastern Region of the U.S. On the one occasion
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that he admits to offering assistance in Utah, his actions were directed by his
employer FCC to assist its own sales force in Utah and were not intentional actions
undertaken by the defendant. Further, the client solicited by FCC, not Melvin, in the
one Utah visit, was not either a Utah nor U.S. firm. Further, regardless of the
outcome of the GEC visit, Melvin would not have had any recourse to the courts of
Utah, in fact, he would not have had any legal recourse at all. FCC was the host and
instigating party. Any contract would have occurred between FCC and GEC. Thus
plaintiff has alleged nothing to show that defendant either purposefully availed
himself of the privilege of conducting business in Utah or conducting such activities
that would allow him to invoke the protections and benefits of the Utah courts.
"The minimum contacts standard is not susceptible of mechanical application
and, instead, involved an ad hoc analysis of the facts. . . . the number of contacts has
no talismanic significance but that the quality of the contacts as demonstrating
purposeful availment is the issue." Rocky Mountain Claim Staking v. Frandsen, 884 P.2d
1299,1301 (Utah App. 1994), and cases cited therein. It should be noted that on
none of the defendant's trips to Utah did he make any sales, receive or place any
order; or otherwise conduct the activities he was hired to conduct for the Eastern
region. If the plaintiff s contention is that it can establish in personam jurisdiction in its
home state by requiring attendance of his employees at meetings and conferences, the
logical conclusion to this argument would be that an employer could force an
individual employee to travel 2000 miles to maintain his job and the require him to
defend himself in local court against a declaratory judgment. By imposing the
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additional burdens and costs the plaintiff could automatically provide itself with an
unfair advantage which is exacdy what it is attempting to do.
"An individual's contract with an out-of-state party cannot alone automatically
establish sufficient minimum contracts in the other part/ s home forum. Instead the
prior negotiations and contemplated future consequences, along with the terms of the
contract and the parties' actual course of dealing, must be evaluated to determine
whether the defendant purposefully established minimum contacts." Burger King at
pages 478-9. Neither contract signed by Melvin was negotiated, drafted or signed by
Melvin in Utah. See Synergetics, supra; therefore, the existence of the contract does not
pass the requisite purposeful activity nor minimal contacts. The contract signed by
Melvin and FCC, which incidentally has no choice of law or venue provision,
specifically limited his responsibilities to clients in the Eastern Region of the U.S. not
Utah. (If the defendant had solicited Utah customers even if he had never entered
the state, plaintiff might prevail), see Neways v. McCauland, 950 P.2d 420 (Utah 1997).
But he never did and the plaintiff has failed to show that he did.
"To exercise jurisdiction consistent with due process, the non resident
defendant must have "minimum contact with the forum state such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice. International Shoe at page 316. "These minimum contacts must be
the basis of plaintiff s claim." Synergistics atpage 1110. Arguello v. Industrial Woodworking
Machine Co., 838 P. 2d 1120,1123 (Utah, 1992). The U.S. Supreme Court has
suggested two modes for analyzing whether minimum contact are present: the
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"arising out of" test and the "stream of commerce test" Hansen v. Deckla 357 U.S.
235,250-4, rehearing denied, 358 U.S. 858 (1958); see also Arguello, supra and cases
cited therein. Plaintiff has never advanced the stream of commerce argument nor
does it apply, leaving the arising out of test. Plaintiffs complaint sought declaratory
relief in Utah from a demand letter and potential complaint sent to defendant's
employer for (according to plaintiff) "compensation for potential future sales to
prospective customers and entitlement to commissions or seminars after the date of
his resignation (sic)." Plaintiff was asking the Utah court to grant it protection from
defendant's claims for income due him for his work in the Eastern Region with
clients located within his region. It should be noted that none of the customers
listed in the draft complaint are Utah corporations. Specific personal jurisdiction
"may be asserted . . . only on claims arising out of defendant's forum state activity."
Newajs, Inc. v. McCausaland, 950 P.2d 420,423 (Utah 1997). Here there is no
connection between the relief sought and defendant's contacts with Utah. All of the
actions taken by Melvin regarding the relief he sought took place in and around the
state of Maryland and were directed at clients and potential clients located there.
These sales did not "arise out of" any trips he took to Utah, nor do the trips to Utah,
with the exception of the one day spent consulting for free to FCC personnel for a
non Utah company, have any reasonable connection to the relief sought. "Generally,
the more closely related the contacts are to the cause of action for which jurisdiction
is taken, the fewer contacts are necessary to establish jurisdiction." Rocky Mountain
Claim Staking v. William, 884 P.2 1299,1301-2 (Utah App. 1994), conversely where the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
31 may contain errors.
Machine-generated OCR,

nexus between the contacts and the cause of action is non existent, one allegation
that defendant once, at his employer's insistence, provided assistance in Utah to Utah
based sales staff, is hardly sufficient to support the plaintiffs allegation of in personam
jurisdiction.
In Roskelley v. Lerco, Inc., 610 P.2d 1307,1310 (Utah 1980), the Court noted,
'Where jurisdiction is challenged, plaintiff cannot solely rely on allegation of
jurisdiction in the face of an affidavit by defendant which specifically contradicts
those general allegations." Melvin notes that the plaintiff has intentionally declined to
support its allegations with any declarations or affidavits. The Roskelly Court had
before it, as this court does, the mere allegation by the plaintiff in its complaint that
the defendant "worked and performed services in Utah and solicited customers in the
State of Utah." The defendant answered this allegation in a sworn affidavit alleging
material and specific facts that contradicted the allegation of jurisdiction. Absent
something more from the plaintiff (which was not present in that case or this), the
court dismissed due to lack of personal jurisdiction.
The instant case is similar to Bradford, supra in which the court found
insufficient contacts with the State of Mississippi for a judgment against Utah
residents. In that case the Mississippi resident initiated the negotiations for sale of
Utah property, and personally inspected the property in Utah. The contract for sale
was to be performed entirely in Utah and partial payment was made in Mississippi.
Similarly, the employment letter signed by Melvin and FCC was executed by Melvin
in Maryland. The agreement does not indicate which state's courts would have
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jurisdiction should a conflict arise. Melvin never knowingly, intentionally or
unintentionally, subjected himself to the jurisdiction of the Utah courts. His activities
in Utah were of short duration and did not involve the exercise of the duties he was
hired to perform. He maintained no connections to Utah or continuing relationships
or obligations to Utah residents, outside of the fact that he was employed by a
corporation that did business throughout the world but had its home office in Utah.
The Court in Bradford found that to subject the defendant to in personam
jurisdiction on the facts would offend "the traditional conception of fair play and
substantial justice." 763 P.2d at 795.
Even where a court has found that a defendant had established the necessary
minimal contact with the forum state, "these contacts may be considered in light of
other factors to determine whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would
comport with "fair play and substantial justice." Thus courts may appropriately
evaluate the "burden on the defendant" against "the forum State's interest in
adjudicating the dispute." "As we have previously noted, jurisdictional rules may not
be employed in such a way as to make litigation so gravely difficult and inconvenient
that a party is unfairly at a severe disadvantage to his opponent" Burger King at page
478. Accord, Roske/ky, supra. Even if the plaintiff had met its burden in establishing a
factual foundation for in personam jurisdiction in Utah, which it has not, there is no
question that requiring the defendant, an individual who was unemployed for a
significant period of time due to actions of his Utah employer, with no ties, resources
or contacts in Utah, to defend an action 2000 miles from his home requiring untold
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expense in obtaining legal assistance, witnesses, travel expenses and all of the related
costs attendant in defending himself against a multi million dollar, multi national
corporation with huge resources at its disposal and representation in Maryland, who
would suffer no hardship from having this case heard in Maryland, effectively denies
the defendant his right to have his grievance redressed, his day in court and his right
to due process of law.
While the instant claim may "arise out of" Melvin' s employment contract, it
does not arise out of any activities of his in Utah. In Viacom v. Melvin Simon
Productions, 11A F. Supp. 858 (S.D.N.Y.) the court adopted the same reasoning in a
case involving the request for a declaratory judgment. Quoting Columbia Pictures
Industries, Inc. v. Schneider, 435 F. Supp 742-749-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), affd 573 F.2d
1288 (2nd Cir. 1978), the court stated that the plaintiff (like FCCS) was "merely
seek[ing] a declaratory judgment that it did not injure the nondomiciliary defendants.
It is difficult to understand in what way a cause of action for a declaration that
plaintiff did not injure defendants 'may fairly be said to have arisen' out of
defendant's transaction of business in the state . . . The remedial purposes of the long
arm statute would not be promoted by a finding that personal jurisdiction exists here;
indeed, where no injury to the plaintiff is claimed, it seems more likely that the state
courts would adhere to . . . " a more restrictive view where the plaintiff claims no
injury at all from the defendant's business transactions in the state. 774 F. Supp. At
863.
V.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction.
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All of the documents introduced in this case clearly indicated that defendant's
employment relationship was with FCC not FCCS. In fact, it wasn't until several
months after he was fired that he received a W-2 form from FCCS thereby learning
of its identity for the first time. Defendant argued to the trial court that it had no
evidence before it that FCCS was the "real party in interest" pursuant to Rule 17(a)
U.R.C.P. and that no privity existed between it and the defendant. Further, that
corporations and their subsidiaries, unlike corporate divisions, are separate entities
each with its own rights and obhgations. 'When a corporation sues or is sued in its
corporate name, the action is by or against the corporation itself as a legal entity." 19
Am]ur2d§2173.

"Generally service of process on a subsidiary is not valid as service

upon a parent corporation, nor is service on the parent valid as to the subsidiary." 19
Amjur 2d §2193. In other words, under general principles of corporate law, parents
and subsidiaries are separate and distinct entities and cannot sue or be sued on behalf
of each other except in very specialized circumstances. Utah law is in accord.
"A corporation, be it parent or subsidiary, has its own legal identity and
existence. Common ownership or control does not automatically destroy that
separate identity. Although in appropriate cases equity may look through the
corporate shell to its alter ego to prevent fraud or wrongdoing, the general rule still
applies that corporations are separate legal entities bound by the obhgations as well as
the benefits." Institutional Laundry v. Utah State Tax Commission, 706 P.2d 1066,1067
(Utah, 1985), citing Surgical Supply Center v. Industrial Commission of Utah, Dept. of
Employment Security 223 P. 2d 593, 595 (Utah, 1950). FCC and FCCS are separate legal
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entities, each bound by its own obligations and benefits. Therefore, it was totally
inappropriate for FCCS to attempt to obtain judgment against the defendant on
behalf of FCC without joining FCC. Even more to the point, "|l]n this situation the
consideration of justice, which so requires is simply that a controlling corporation,
such as Omnico, should not be permitted to manage and operate a business from
which it stands to gain whatever profit may be made, have the advantage of the
efforts of those who serve i t and then use nomenclature of another corporation as a
facade to insulate it from responsibility for paying for such services/' (emphasis added)
Chatterly v. Omnico, 485 P.2d 667, 670 (Utah, 1971). The relationship between the
plaintiff and FCC, that FCCS was a wholly owned subsidiary of FCC was a mystery
to the defendant when this suit against him was instituted. The defendant only
learned some time after this suit against him was instituted against him and even then
all he learned was that FCCS was a wholly owned subsidiary of FCC, not that FCCS
had any relationship to the defendant. Both letters of agreement signed by the
defendant were with FCC, FCC was his sponsor with INS. As his personnel file
supports, all of his written communications were with FCC.
Whatever the relationship between FCC and FCCS, the fact remains that the
FCC operated a business which employed the defendant, had the advantage of the
defendant's efforts on its behalf, and made money from his efforts. It is a misuse of
the powers of the Utah judicial system to ask it to sanction an attempt by FCCS and
FCC to evade FCC s legal responsibilities and obligations. "There is no doubt about
the correctness of the proposition urged by the defendant that a party should not be
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permitted to use corpontiniis u|- siiiiikn

HUIIKN

to rngii^e in it now vou see it now you

don't legerdemain and thus trick or cheat another." Centurian Corp. v. Fiberchem, Inc.,
562 R2d 1252,1253 (Utah, 1977.) This is exactly what the plaintiff, I CCS, and. its
counsel have attempted l< ilu I'M (In Mini ii»r ul ill. immeiK htute "Franklin
Covey" (in its pleadings without identifying which corporation it means), it has
attempted to obscure the legal distinction between the separate legal entities FCCS
and H X m i ! "i I1 i , vide H (% responsibilities jml deny die defendant his day in
court. However, this "artful pleading" should not be sanctioned by this Court
particularly in light of the fact that FCC has now admitted under oath through a
lawful,, clearly designated representati v e that it and FCCS are separate companies.
(See Attachment B, defendant's Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order, "Verified
Answer of Franklin Covey Co. filed in the case of Bay v i » * Mipen \ t mrt,
Orange Coiiii-h, * ;,il

'SI!? ??)

It should be noted that plaintiff, FCCS, chose both the forum and the parties.
When privity was raised rather than amending its complaint to include FCC, as
permitted by ilii" Until Riiii •,, m nn^iniilly attempted 11 t ignore the issue by obfiiscation
and finally chose to submit a dubious document entided "Consent to be Bound,"
which is notable for its originality but not its probative value "It, as here, pkunhif •
j i ttus -as ;i renl patty m mleresl depends upon an assignment from the original real
party in interest, it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove, in addition to the basic
elements of its case, its status as an assignee." Alpine AsMMiak, hit, /• KPc^K hit,, 8(1'
990). By its own admission, argued by plaintiff to the
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court after Declaratory Judgment had been ordered, in its response to defendant's
Motion for Relief from the Courfs Order, the "Consent to be Bound" "was not an
actual assignment but merely notice to the court that an assignment" (which had
never been submitted to the court before it made its Declaratory Judgment ruling)
"had occurred," thereby leaving the court with no proof on which to base its
decision. This was not sufficient to meet the plaintiff s burden, see Alpine, supra. In
accord, Delta Traffic Service, Inc. v. Sysco Intermountain Food Services, 944 F.2d 911, (10th
Cir. 1991), "the burden of proving an assignment is upon him who claims
thereunder." Under this rationale, the court had no evidence of the assignment,
hence no valid basis on which to rule that the plaintiff was the real party in interest
and thus, that subject matter jurisdiction existed.
"Rule 17 seeks to protect the interests of judicial economy and fairness to the
parties in litigation." Anderson v. Reynolds, 841 P.2d 742, 744 (footnote 3) (Utah App.
1992). Despite plaintiffs contentions to the contrary, the dubious assignment,
Attachment F to plaintiff s Memorandum in Opposition to Melvin' s Motion for
Relief from Judgment or Order, was, as the record clearly reflects, the first time
defendant had ever seen or had notice of the existence of the said document. This
purported assignment was undated, thereby providing no clue to when it was signed,
and not under oath, thereby further undermining any probative value that it might
have had.
In response plaintiff cites Lynch v. MacDonald, 367 P.2d 464 (Utah 1962) in
which the court held that an assignee is the real party in interest. However, in that
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case, unlike this o n e , a close reading suggests
before it about the assignment, o n which to base its decision. Plaintiff also attempts
to avoid the issue o f notice by alleging that notice was provided by the 1997 W 2
(providec

defendant

^CNCIUI

mmilli iitln hi wii;. litnlj iiml lluii dcfcndim It.id

notice of the undated assignment which surfaced for the first time in post trial
motions filed by plaintiff in October, 1998). "The burden of proof and of ultimate
persuasion of all., the essentials of its cai lse of action > \ as up : n the pla intiff." I hople r
Finance and Thrift Co. p. Landes, 503 P.2d 4 4 4 , 4 4 5 - 6 (Utah 1972), including f o o t n o t e 3 ,
"plaintiff has the burden o f proving that the obligor had notice o f an assignment," see
Pillbmylm

t a »< I )//a «Vi hi \\

M ' H \ IMIIIH

I<I ,ii

\ITOMI,

Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ ofLatter-Day

hank oj W / I i / I , - 1 ! ".
Saints, 534 P . 2 d

887(Utah 1975). Since the plaintiff failed t o meet its burden o f proving that an
effective assignment hud i « i a m i r d illit\nri;> \{ In pntsm llii1^ r.isc ,is a rrul p:irf\ \\\
interest, and as it further chose not to amend its complaint to include the real party in
interest, FCC, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and should have
dismissed the case.
In 4447 Associates v. First Security Financial, 889 P.2d 467 (Utah App. 1995) the
court noted: "Because 4447 Associates would materially benefit from a favorable
determina t ic *i • :>f its rights as an assignee seeking t o enforce an assignment (as FCCS
w o u l d in this case), it bore the burden o f proving First Security received notice o f the
assignment." 889 P.2d at

I h e court then found that adequate legal notice had

not been receiv eel 889 I

i / '3 In th z instant case, Judge Young made no
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finding of fact regarding this issue, unless one considers footnote 2 of the
Declaratory Judgment order which states, "[H]owever, the Court finds it is immaterial
whether Melvin was employed by FCCS or FCC. This action concerns only one
employee, one employer, and one employment relationship." This was news to the
defendant who knew of the existence of himself as the employee, FCC as his
employer and his employment relationship with FCC not FCCS. The 4447 court
went on to state that the standard of review concerning whether or not a party had
notice of a particular occurrence was a finding of fact, which it would review under
the clearly erroneous standard, however, determination concerning the effect of
notice presented a question of law which was reviewed for correctness. 889 P.2d
471. At a minimum this "finding" by Judge Young does not address whether or not
defendant received adequate notice, it merely declared the need for notice irrelevant,
and, it is submitted, is clearly erroneous. Moreover, the effect of the so called notice,
"the Consent to be Bound" definitely prejudiced the defendant's rights and under the
standard of review set forth in 4447 Associates^ this Court should declare the action a
nullity.
The question remains why the plaintiff chose the course of action it did rather
than simply amend its complaint. The plaintiffs contention that the result of this
case would be the same regardless of which company is the defendant's employer is
untrue. Had the plaintiff acted appropriately and amended its complaint rather than
create an end run around the Rules of Civil Procedure, he would have lost his favored
spot in the race to the courthouse and a very different outcome would have likely
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occurred in the case latter filed by defendant in Ma;!:} la rid

\ lsow hile Ji ldge Y on iiig

studiously failed t o address this issue despite the facts and overwhelming case law
presented t o him, it is quite possible that another court would b e less accommodating
and m o r e likely to requite -i "Atu It i

.UIIUTCIUT

in ilir Kiiilcs it I mil Pun nlurc

Finally, a ruling by this Court o n this issue is also of significant importance t o
the administration of justice because of its potential impact o n the issues of Rule
17(a) status, priv it ) and subject mat ter j\ irisdiction as "w ell as those of ji idicial
economy a n d fairness t o parties in a lawsuit and the limits t o which this Court will
allow their use or abuse. T h e defendant, an individual w h o is a resident of Maryland,

served with a summons) purporting to represent his former employer after the
defendant sent that employer a demand letter having failed in obtaining relief through
ui I in ni 11 ,il iiirgfjiifiiiiinii,.

Iln lifii ilii loniin nii|»loyi •

plaintiff are multi national

corporations with significant resources. Both d o business in and would b e subject to
the jurisdiction of the Maryland courts. Melvin's ties to Utah are extremely tenuous
al best. ( kih llifnu(t>li J iuiluinl trjdifip, nil §78 ?7 ,?4i h 1 Itah < ,odi \ n n Us finleii
it has been conceded that this is the only possible provision of §78-27-24 that has any
applicability) could a trial court allow this case to proceed rather than either requiring
the plainti ff to amend its :::c mplaint or iis missing it for lack c -f si ibject matter
jurisdiction. Determining the limits of §78-27-24(1) Utah Code Ann. is an important
issue for this Court 7 s consideration. Otherwise, it would b e possible for subsidiary of
any giant corporation like General M» •(< »r =- < »r I'mir \\ »n»<T t<» <\iv any rmph lyre * )*' i»
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parent company in any locale where that subsidiary does business no matter how
lacking or remote the connection is between the subsidiary and the employee, e.g.
Hughes Aircraft, a wholly owned subsidiary of General Motors, could sue an
automotive assembly line worker employed in Detroit by GM over the terms of that
worker's employment contract with GM and file that suit in the state of Connecticut
where Hughes does business, although the employee's only contact may have been to
drive through the state once or twice on his way to some other destination. This
could hardly be the intent of the drafters of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
III.

Mechanical Adoption.
The record supports a finding that the trial court mechanically adopted the

findings of fact and conclusions of law prepared and presented by counsel for the
plaintiff7. The trial courf s findings mirror exactly the proposed findings propoimded
by the plaintiff. The transcript from the hearing made clear that the trial court was
confused as to Melvin' s ties to Utah. Counsel for the plaintiff incorrectly informed
the court that Melvin "conducted business here by attempting to recruit clients and
he is seeking compensation (sic) that very activity, and that, therefore, specific person
jurisdiction does exist. But it may be wise to make a ruling on that motion." At
which point the trial court ruled that it had personal jurisdiction, the only
pronouncement that came from the trial court, and was based on misinformation
which the court would have discovered if it had merely read defendant's submissions.
The rest of the alleged findings of fact were the work product of plaintiff s counsel.
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though Maryland law was not briefed for it nor it is clear it had the jurisdiction to do
so (The judge thus signing an Order that was manifestly incorrect.) The court also
iievei .iddrrs11 ill mini Rult I HA)

ISSIU

, jlilln mj.»h .is ilrtiiuiistotof 1»\ plinnhl'fs amnsi'l,

defendant raised it at least 11 time. Instead the court adopted in its Declaratory
Judgment Order the reasoning and wording of plaintiff s counsel, that the argument

employment relationship."
There is nothing in the record of this case 'that indicates the indicia normally

considered the merits of the case. Automactic Control Products, Corp. v. Tel-Tech, Inc. 780
P 2d 1 258 ( Utah 1989) ; l •: mdicia in Automactic Control .. . - "Hat the trial judge took
the case under ad vis en. *

• :

- r.

and later

requested from both parties proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. In the
instant case judge Young, after unaccountably refusing to allow the defendant to
participate bj telephone in the hearing, announced his ruling from the bench and
then agreed with plaintiffs counsel's request that he prepare the Orders. Defendant
was only given notice of these proposed Order because the 1 Itali rules required
plaintiff s counsel to do so. Otherwise he would have been shut out completely. The
Boyer Company v. UgneU, 567 P. 2d 1112 (Utah 1977) in which the indicia included the
fact that w hili llie Imlmuil ,i>knt llinr pin ailing |urt\ indratl tuulm^, llic losing

7

For this Court* s convenience the plaintiff s proposed Orders have been included in
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party was permitted to file objections and proposed amendments which were argued
before the trial court. In the instant case defendant* s objections were ignored by the
trial court. Accord, Alia Industries, Ltd v. Hurst, 846 P. 2d 1282 (Utah 1993). State v.
James, 858 P.2d 1012 (Utah App. 1993), the findings were sufficiently detailed to allow
the appellate court to review the trial courf s decision. The findings is this case are
meager at best.
IV.

Insufficient Findings of Fact to Support Conclusions of Law.
The trial court's findings of fact are insufficient to support its conclusions of

law. The declarations adjudged by the court in the Declaratory Judgment Order are
beyond the scope of the facts found by the court in the Summary Judgment Order,
and are not supported by the record. In its Summary Judgment Order the court
found the following: "The Defendant* s Motion(s) to Dismiss are hereby DENIED."
(The only supporting item was a footnote in which the Court stated it found both
Motions asserting lack of personal jurisdiction unmeritorious) and "[T]here are no
genuine issues of material fact and plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law." There were no further findings. Yet in its Declaratory Judgment Order the
court declared the following: "(1) Franklin Covey has no contractual, implied or
other obligation to pay Defendant Melvin commissions or any other compensation
related to seminars held or future seminars scheduled to be held or products sold
subsequent to the September 12,1997 effective date of Defendant Melvin's
separation from Franklin Covey; (2) the Release signed by Defendant Melvin on

the Addendum as Attachments D and E.
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November 1 3 199 7 bars all claims relate d to payment of compensation :>t:
commissions for services performed by Melvin during his employment with Franklin;
and (3) Franklin's policy and practice with respect to the payment of commissions to
separa ted Account Execut i v e s is not v iola t ive of law " In a footnote, the court held
found that the "declaratory relief herein is required under both Utah and Maryland
law." The court is therefore not required to determine which law applies to this
dispute ' W hilr ,iiliiimnll\ \iwmy, lh< fiLmiiifl all tin IIU'III 1 n

HI Id

dream of and

more, unfortunately, the court failed to consider the record before it and whether or
not its findings were support by that record.
I n fac i„ ilif i ( null < i imimtlnl several e r t o i s of luw

trial court may relieve a party of a judgment in a case of
court." Bischelv. Merritt, 90S P.2d J
f

* Kin s>p

"Huh 1 60(bVD provides a

mistake of law by the trial
.onclusions of la:u

KI/ r- of facts and the judgment

or decree must follow the conclusions of law. Where there is variance the judgement
must be corrected to conform to the findings." Gillmor, supra at page 436.
Except: for one Marj land case cited by the plaintiff in its original
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, which dealt with a
general legal principle regarding contract interpretation, ti in It i ,t le^iii iluon, dull undisputed by the defendant, neither side briefed nor presented any arguments to the
trial court citing Maryland law. While the Declaratory Judgment making the court* s
Order applicable under Maryland law (;iml iliiis picMini.ihlv .Hlciiiphn^ lo totolose
future action in the Maryland courts), may demonstrate the value of Rule 5(b)(2)
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U.R.C.P. to a prevailing party (particularly one in a sympathetic forum), this alone
cannot possibly justify the overreaching that this declaration demonstrates.
In its response to plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, defendant raised
the following affirmative defenses: (1) there was no express agreement between the
parties; (2) the terms of the April 9,1997 letter are ambiguous and thus do not
preclude an unjust enrichment cause of action; (3) that defendanf s consent to the
April 9,1997 agreement was produced by duress; (4) that there was a lack of a
meeting of the minds regarding the April 9,1997 letter thus no agreement was
formed; (5) that FCCS and/or the real party in interest, Franklin Covey Co. breached
its implied covenant of good of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court in its
meager Summary Judgment findings failed to address any of these issues . "Summary
judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entided to judgment as a matter of law." Crowther v. Mower, 876 P.2d
876, 878 (Utah App. 1994). Since the court failed to address any of these legitimate
issues raised by the defendant in its findings, it is impossible to determine how these
impacted the findings that were made, or if they were considered at all. In its
Opposition to Summary Judgment, the defendant had further argued to the court
that summary judgment was inappropriate at that juncture because there were clear
factual issues in controversy and that information developed through discovery
would aid this court in determining what, if any issues, were appropriate for summary
determination, and what issues should remain for the trier of fact 'When a motion is
made opposing summary judgment on the ground discovery has not been completed,
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the coi ir t should grant a cc nt i tin na n e e • :>JI: d e n y the motion for si immarj judgment."
Auerback v. Kimball, 572 P.2d 376, 377 (Utah 1977). See also American Towers supra at
page 11 (Utah 1996).
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Article I, Section 7, of the Utah Constitution states that "[N]o person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."
iii-iil m i s u s e n ( filir ( , < m r h o f 1 'dill in fins

CASV 1»V

The overreaching

ihv plaintiff in its efforts t o d e n y t h e

defendant even the appearance of due process cries out for redress.
1

It is respectfully requested that this Court enter an Order dismissing
jurisdiction or in the alternative remand
this matter to the trial court with instructions to enter the appropriate
judgment of dismissal in favor of the defendant.
I is further respectfully requested that this Court enter an Order
awarding costs and attorney's fees to the defendant or in the alternative
remand this matter to the trial court with instructions to oiirr (lie
appropriate ji ldgment for costs and attorney^ s fees.

For all of the reason stated above, the judgement of the trial court must be
d i s m i s s e d o r r e m a n d e d Willi in ilir l m l n mil Willi MisMurh'»iv< l o v v u i (Ii
appropriate judgment of dismissal in favor of the defendant
Respectfully submitted,

Marsha A. Ostrer, Esq.
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NEIL A. KAPLAN, Esq. #3974
CLYDE, SNOW, SESSIONS & SWENSON, P.C.
1 Utah Center, Suite 1300
201 S. Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2216
Telephone (801) 322-2516
MARSHA A. OSTRER, Esq.
OSTRER & ASSOCIATES
812 Whittington Terrace
Silver Spring, Maryland 20901
Telephone (301) 593-9083
Attorneys for Defendant David Melvin
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on July 16,1999,1 have served two copies of the Brief for
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Franklin Covey Client Sales,
Inc., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

No. 981850

v.
David Melvin, an individual,
Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER
The court defers ruling on plaintiff's motion for
summary disposition until plenary hearing on the matter. The
parties are asked to include the jurisdictional issue in their
briefs. Rule 10(d) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure is
suspended; the parties should proceed to the next stage of the
appellate process.
BY THE COURT:

Richard C. Howe
Chief Justice
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1.
My name is David Melvin I ani a citizen of the United Kingdom and a resident
of the State of Maryland. I know the facts stated in this declaration from personal
knowledge. I am over 18 years of age and am competent to testify to the matters
contained in this declaration.
2
j j i a v e received permaitent work authorization from the U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service (hereinafter INS) to work in the U.S. I am married to a l :
citizen who is a resident of Maryland and has been so for at least the last 15 years. ' r
wife has two children who reside with iis whom I plan to adopt.
3
I w a s employed by Franklin Covey Company for a period of 5 years and 9
months. For 3 years and 6 months I worked for the company in the U.K. as Manager of
Business Operations. My duties included:
a

e.

Developing new business ii it the Unit
jngdom iiiinl i uinpt ii'i iiiiiii in mint
executive.
Maintaining existing customer accounts.
Presenting time and project management workshops to our customers.
Developing, implementing and overseeing business and employee policies
and procedures,
Supervising and managing 18 ei i lployees and managing a $3 5 million
business.

4
11 i 1995 I applied for ai i intra-company transfer to the Shipley Division of
Franklin Covey in the U.S. as I had become engaged to my current wife. I commenced
work with Shipley Associates on July 5, 1995. My place of employment then, and at all
times I was employed by Franklin Covey, was located at 200 Orchard Ridge Drive, Suite
210, Gaithersburg, Maryland 20878. When I first came to the U.S., Franklin Covey, was
knowii as Franklin Quest Co Franklin Covey sponsored my application for immigration
papers with the INS. In that application Franklin Covey acknowledged that I would be
based in the Gaithersburg Office.
5.
I was employed by Frai lklin Covey in the U S between July 1995 and September
1997.
During that time I was given responsibility for sales in the Central Atlantic States
in the Eastern Region. This territory was composed of New Jersey, Pennsylvania,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia and the District of Columbia. In addition
to me, there were five other employees in the Gaithersburg office. These included two
administrative assistants, Ann Coulis and Christine Smith, and three other account
executives, Bob Cuneus, Frank Howard and Matt King. For the first year, my direct
supervisor was Brad Douglas who was located in Utah and later my supervisor was Matt
King who at all relevant times resided in Gaithersburg, Maryland. My duties for the
Eastern Region were as follows: Strategic Business Communications Account Manager
1
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in the Eastern United States and Europe selling writing and presentation training and
consulting services.
6.
I have never resided in the State of Utah. I have no bank account or other
financial ties of any kind to Utah. I own no property in Utah, pay no taxes and have no
other connection to the state other than that I was employed by Franklin Covey. I have
visited the State of Utah 10 times at the request of Franklin Covey. The dates of these
visits and their purposes are as follows:
April 20, 1992
October 12, 1992
July 2, 1993
June 22, 1994
January 2, 1995
August 21, 1995
January 2, 1996
September 11, 1996
November 25, 1996
May 30, 1997

10 days
4 days
4 days
4 days
2 days
4 days
4 days
3 days
2 days
1 day

Induction training
Conference
Conference
Conference
Job interviews
Conference
Conference
Sales retreat
Program training
Meeting with GEC U.K.

7.
Most of these were meetings for sales representatives from around the world
whom Franklin Covey invited to Salt Lake City for meetings. While in Utah I conducted
no business other than that related to the meetings I attended. I have no clients who are
based in Utah. The only exception to the above was a meeting I attended in May of
1997 for the purpose of assisting Franklin Covey in understanding the needs of an
existing U.K. client, known as GEC. Since I knew GEC when I worked in the U.K., I
was asked by Franklin to help Franklin's sales staff in Utah understand GECs needs.
Franklin Covey requested that I attend. I did not attempt to sell products or services to
GEC in Utah. I did not receive any compensation for this trip (although my only
compensation at that time was a straight commission) and no sale resulted in Utah at the
time. I understand that later sales took place in the U.K.. The only other time I was
scheduled to attend a business meeting in Utah was on August 20, 1997 when I was
about to board an airplane to Utah, but was fired by telephone at the airport. It was
never my intention to subject myself to the laws of Utah nor to seek the protection of
Utah law.
8.
All acts pertinent to this complaint occurred in and around the State of Maryland.
(All of the states in my territory border Maryland, except for New Jersey, which is
separated from Maryland by less then 20 miles.) I have signed no contractual document
with Franklin Covey or any related entity agreeing to the application of the laws of the
State of Utah in any case or controversy relating to my employment.
9.
Should this case go to trial, the following categories of witnesses are likely to
testify:
9
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

a.

Employees of Franklin Covey located in and around Maryland, l o the
best of my knowledge Franklin Covey employs 10 account executives and
10 training consultants residing in and around the Maryland area for the
Eastern Region.

b.

1 oirnei employees ot Franklin Covey, l o the best ot my knowledge there
aie approximately six former Franklin Covey employees with knowledge of
matters pertinent hereto and who live in and around the Maryland area.

c.

Former clients of mine who purchased and/or continue to purchase services
and products from Franklin Covey. See attached Exhibit A. The
breakdown for these companies is as follows:
10 in Maryland
14 in Virginia
1 in West Virginia
5 in DC
I in Delaware
20 in Pennsylvania
20 in New Jersey
1 in New York
3 in Europe

10
Except foi (he European clients, all of the clients are within a few hours drive of
Maryland. The costs of obtaining willing witnesses to testify would be much greater if
this matter is heard in Utah
11.
Most ot (lit souiees ot proof are in Maryland. 1 conducted business (when not
visiting clients on site) either at the Gaithersburg office or at my home in Silver Spring,
Maryland. Additionally, Franklin Covey does considerable business in the State ot
Maryland. Franklin Covey also maintains a client contact management system which
record all client contacts This system, is available from any computer with a modem.
12.
Until 1998, when I received my W-2 form ioi 1997 and was served with the
summons in this ease, I had no idea that I might have been working for Franklin Covey
Client Sales, Inc since none of my employment related documents used that name
13.
I he sponsoring organization on my INS application was originally Franklin Qutsl
Company and later Franklin Covey Consulting Group. Based on documents in my
possession and personnel documents previously requested by me from Franklin Covey, at
no time did I enter into any relationship, contractual or otherwise, with Franklin Covey
Client Sales, Tnc
14.

Franklin Covey operates a letail

i n n Ih it sells SIIJIJIIM

mil illh i 1 ihiiil lin I
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materials in Towson, Maryland and has operated this store during the entire period of
time I worked for Franklin Covey in America. Additional retail stores are operated in
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia and the District of Columbia.
15.
On or about February 5, 1998, my Maryland attorney sent a negotiation letter to
Franklin Covey Co.. A copy of that letter is attached to this declaration (without its own
attachments) as Exhibit B.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Date:

dm^

Afof & * ftpf

David Melvin
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David Melvin
Supplemental Declaration

My name is David Melvin. I am 54 years old. I am a resident of Maryland. I am
married to an American citizen who has two children, a 13 year old boy with
profound learning disabilities and a 2 year old baby that I am adopting. We have
been a family for the past 3 years.
I joined Franklin International, Europe, a division of Franklin International Institute,
Inc. in Europe in January 1992 as an Account Executive (AE) and training consultant
based in the United Kingdom (UK). Between January, 1992 and July,1995 I
continued to be employed by Franklin International, Europe in the UK. During that
time I was consistently overall number one for productivity. In January, 1995, I
applied for a transfer to the United States, where Franklin Quest Co. (when Franklin
went public it changed its name to Franklin Quest Co. Franklin Quest Co. is the
direct forerunner of Franklin Covey Co.) is incorporated and has its principal place
of business. I was offered the position of AE for the Central Atlantic States with a
division of Franklin Quest Co. known as Shipley Associates, a Division of Franklin
Quest Co.
I signed a letter of agreement on May 9, 1995 with Shipley Associates. This letter set
forth the terms of my employment. This letter contains no reference to what laws
would apply if a conflict arose between my employer and myself nor did it contain any
provision regarding timing and payment of commissions for sales of services and
goods.
I started in work in the U.S. in Maryland in July, 1995. My supervisor at that time
was Jeff Call. Mr. Call or someone else from the home office in Utah would often
visit the Maryland office. All of my activities were directed at developing business
within my territory, the Central Atlantic States. At that time my employer maintained
an office at 200 Orchard Ridge Drive, Gaithersburg, Maryland that contained office
space for AE's and two administrative assistants. I either worked out of that office or
at home where I maintained a separate office business phone line, or traveled to visit
clients within the Central Atlantic States (which I did on a regular basis.) Christine
Smith, who was the administrative assistant in the Maryland office and is a resident of
Maryland (and would testify at trial in Maryland if called) was my primary support
and provided administrative and clerical support to my work in the Central Atlantic
States. The other administrative assistant, Ann Coulis, also a resident of Maryland,
also has knowledge of my activities.
It should be noted that at the time that I assumed my actual duties in the U.S., I was
informed that my employer had arbitrarily cut back on the territory for which I would
be responsible, therefore cutting back my income potential. I estimate the total
existing business taken from me at that time to have had a value of at least $300,000
per annum. Despite all of this I achieved a 68% growth in sales from S227K in 1995
to S382K in 1996. This was my first experience with Franklin Covey Co. going back
on a promise that they had made to me to their advantage and my disadvantage.
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I had no formal performance appraisal at the end of fiscal 1995 or 1996 but received
warm tributes from my then immediate supervisor, Brad Douglas, in Utah, and the
then leader of the division, John Harding for my sales performance, for the skill I
applied teaming with other AE's and for working with their clients to improve overall
sales for Franklin Quest in 1994. When I inquired about a formal, on the record
performance appraisal, Brad Douglas informed me that this did not happen here in
the U.S.
My team was reorganized at the start of fiscal 1997 into area teams in the division
rather than product in different parts of the country. The three product teams were:
Strategic Business Communications, (SBC), Business Development Services, (BDS),
and Projects. I was part of the SBC group and had line responsibility for the Eastern
area. My immediate supervisor was Matt King, who lived and worked in Maryland.
At the start of fiscal 1997, I was given a non-negotiable goal of $650 K for fiscal 1997
which represented a 41% increase over fiscal 1996 actual sales. This was the largest
increase in my product group even though I had the least tenure. This was my second
experience of arbitrary behavior on the part of my employer that benefited the
employer and hurt me.
In fiscal 1997 I was given little support for the projects part of the business which
represented 50% of my goal. This particular part of the business required support
from another branch of the business. This project goal was a joint one. The person
assigned to me (Steve Hilton) in 1997 was inexperienced and unmotivated. He
subsequently left the company but only after he had done our mutual sales goal grave
damage. I brought this to the attention of Matt King who agreed but indicated that
he was helpless to do anything about it.
I raised this issue again with Matt King at our November 1996 strategy meeting,(my
over-riding concern was Hilton's availability, he did not respond to voice messages,
and was evasive about coming East to work together.). King agreed and said he was
having problems supervising him and he thought Hilton was trying to breakaway from
his supervision. Again he said he had complained to upper management, but nothing
was being done. Matt King became sick at this time and was out of action for the
remainder of the 1997 fiscal year. So I was lacking management direct support.
Finally, in desperation, I formally brought the problem to the attention of Jeff
Shumway, the Vice President responsible for sales for the Eastern Region at our
regional conference at the beginning of December 1996 held in Gaithersburg,
Maryland, to be told that, whilst it was a problem, we would just have to figure out a
way of dealing with it ourselves. (Other AE's applauded me for this stance saying it
was long overdue.) The problem was never resolved and Hilton found another job
elsewhere in March 1997. By this time all of senior management were being
consumed by the merger with Covey and no replacement was made.
On April 1, 1997, I went to the office as was my practice. I was expecting to have a
meeting with Jeff Butler, a Franklin Quest Co. Vice President who was visiting the
Maryland office from Utah. I had been told that the purpose of the meeting was a
strategy meeting to discuss third quarter activities and business forecast and had
prepared accordingly. I was stunned when informed by Mr. Butler, upon my arrival at
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9 a.m. that my position was being eliminated with immediate effect. I was told I was
expected to leave the office that week and turn over all files, and, keys and credit
cards. I was given a letter (on Franklin Quest Co. letterhead) to sign stating that
Franklin Quest Co. would pay me approximately six weeks compensation (pre-tax) in
return for waiving any and all legal rights I had in the matter. This was my third
experience with arbitrary and capricious behavior on the part of my employer that
benefited my employer to my detriment. Needless to say, I refused to sign and waive
any of my rights or any of Franklin Quest Co.'s liability. I was told by Jeff Butler that
he had been told to "fix the East" and "cut heads" because of the approaching merger
with Covey. Jeff Butler went on to say that this decision was a tragedy because of the
effort that I had made without a manager, without a project partner and because of
the business developed in the previous quarter for the future. He was visibly relieved
when I asked if there was anyway this decision could be reversed.
12.

I was astounded because in the three months prior to this event, I had received
constant affirmations from Jeff Shumway that I was a "class act" and that when the
merger was completed there would be space for everyone currently working for both
Franklin and Covey in the new organization - i.e. no firings were intended.

13.

I asked if the decision to eliminate my position was negotiable and was told that it
was. I immediately contacted Jeff Shumway and he told me that he had heard that I
wished to negotiate and said, yet again, that I was a "first class act" and that he
looked forward to receiving my proposal to remain with Franklin Quest Co.

14.

For the next several days, I worked hard on a straight commission proposal that
would have left me whole and left the company without risk if I did not perform. I
negotiated in good faith for a week fully expecting that Jeff Shumway would stand by
his commitment to "keep me whole" until the new organization was in place in
September, 1997, after which time I could return to my former status and be
rewarded in exactly the same way as all other client partners( the new title for AEs).

15.

I proposed to Franklin Quest Co. that I be paid on a commission basis only and for it
to be set around the average commissions paid to others in the organization (between
15% & 20%). Franklin Quest Co. refused and their final offer was a commission rate
of 9% of sales after some fixed costs, an equivalent rate of 6.3%. I had no alternative
but to accept. This was effectively a cutting of my income by 60%. I, to this day, fail
to understand why Franklin Quest Co. did not accept my initial proposal since it
provided for no risk to them but rewarded me adequately if I performed as usual.
This was my fourth experience with Franklin Quest Co.'s arbitrary and capricious
behavior that benefited the company to my detriment. Franklin Quest Co. knew
that I could not obtain work elsewhere in the U.S. immediately, as my work permit
only allowed me to work for them. Therefore, I accepted their non negotiable offer.

16.

Once again Jeff Shumway assured me that he held me in "high regard professionally"
and continued to refer to me as a "class act." Others in the company told me that
everyone "marveled" at how I had handled the situation and that I could expect
different treatment in the future as a result. Even during the week I was temporarily
unemployed, I continued to serve my clients in a demonstration of my good faith.
Mr. Shumway again assured me that I would be "made whole" again when the merger
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with the Covey Co. was completed in September, apologized for the whole affair and
expressed his hopes that I would continue to be a part of the team.
17.

The new arrangement imposed extreme hardships on my family and me. My income
had been cut by 60% with no notice and no time to plan for this outcome. This
produced both financial hardship and emotional distress.

18.

From April 8th 1997 until September 12th 1997 I fully participated in business
development both as an individual and as a team member supporting my colleagues in
their business endeavors. This has always been my modus operandi as many of my
former colleagues will attest and has been the hallmark of the success of every team
with whom I have been involved. It was exciting for me to learn, during this period,
that future compensations would reflect much more of the collegiate and client
relationship efforts than in the past. It was also exciting for me to learn that there
would be no reduction in headcount as a result of the merger. I met and exceeded my
training income goals during this time and began to make inroads into the project
goals set for the year.

19.

Although I was being compensated on unadvantageous commission I willingly
participated in events for the greater good of the company, acting in good faith as a
part of my investment for the future and truly believing that Franklin Quest Co. was
operating in good faith. One example of this was my business relationship with GEC.
Since 1995 I had been developing this from my Maryland office with the U.S.
subsidiary of this UK company based in New Jersey. GEC has businesses located
throughout the Americas. GEC was a former client of mine in the UK. Early in 1997
the director of training for GEC worldwide asked the U.S. subsidiary to set up
meetings with training vendors in the U.S. who had the capability to design and
deliver GEC based training programs . My contact approached me to set up meetings
with senior Franklin people in Utah and stressed the magnitude of business potential
worldwide for Franklin. This I did acting as liaison and agenda developer between the
director of training in the UK and senior management in Utah. While it was not
among the duties I was assigned I undertook it because I believed that everyone in
Franklin would benefit substantially.

20.

Three weeks before the meeting date I was asked by Jeff Butler to fly to Utah for the
meeting to act as host and resolve any cross cultural issues. No compensation was
offered for this trip or these services. I agreed believing, as I was led to believe by
Franklin Quest Co. management, that after this temporary setback, I would be made
whole. No contracts were entered into during this meeting nor orders placed nor
money changed hands and the outcome was an opportunity for Franklin to submit a
business proposal to GEC.

21.

I attended a regional conference in Boston at the beginning of August. At this
conference I was assigned my new role as client partner and met with colleagues who
would be members of the same team based in Washington D.C. There we began the
process of working together to assign territories and clients. Compensation plans had
not been finalized and once again I was assured by Jeff Shumway that I would be
compensated in the same way as all the others; we would share a pool of salary and
commission in a graded structure based on past performance with the company in the
areas of income goals, team relationships, and client development. Territories and
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clients were not resolved at the conference and we continued to work on these as a
team the following week in D.C.
We were scheduled to come together as the new Franklin Covey Co. sales
organization in Utah on August the 20th. when the final compensation plans and
assigned territories would be agreed. Since I had not heard about compensation I
asked Mr. Shumway and others. I was continually assured that I would receive the
same compensation package as all other sales employees. I left Maryland for a
vacation with my family the second week of August but remained in daily contact with
my colleagues in Maryland as we continued to discuss territories and clients. I had
been personally invited by Kevin Cope, the Senior Vice President of Sales to attend
the sales conference in Utah the week of August 18, 1997. Accordingly, my family
and I planned that I would be in Utah at that time.
In addition, I was asked to participate in a panel discussion presentation at the Utah
meeting. I was told it was due to my depth of knowledge, and my experience in cross
selling the vast range of company products and services. During my vacation I spent
considerable time readying my presentation and discussing it with other colleagues
who would be participating.
On August 20th I left my vacation home very early in the morning and was driven by
my wife and children to a commuter bus stop. The trip to the airport was a two hour
trip by bus. I arrived at the airport, checked my bags for the flight and prior to
boarding checked my voice mail one more time. There was a message from Mr.
Shumway asking me to call him before I boarded the plane. I complied and was told
by Mr. Shumway not to come to Utah. That I was to be fired again. Upper
management had decided to ait headcount. He went on to say that he was engrossed
with the sales conference and would get back to me in a couple of days. At that
point I had to break contact with Mr. Shumway in order to get my luggage that was
already loaded onto the airplane. I heard nothing further from Mr. Shumway.
I initiated contact with Mr. Shumway on August 25th by faxing a letter to him asking
for an explanation. Despite ail of the uncertainty I continued to serve my clients and
support colleagues and informed Mr. Shumway of this fact in my letter. Mr.
Shumway left a variety of messages on my answering machine that seemed to indicate
that I had been terminated because of "headcount" although at other times he
contradicted himself. (This was further complicated by the fact that when I finally
obtained a copy of my personnel file from Franklin Covey Co. the information in the
file indicated that I had resigned rather than been terminated.)
I received a phone call at my home in Maryland from Joyce Smith from Franklin
Covey Co. on Monday, September 15th, 1997 confirming that my employment was
terminated as of September 12th, 1997. There were no arrangements or suggestions
of arrangements for compensating for the time I had spent in August and September.
Thirteen days after I sent him a letter Mr. Shumway called and left me a message
which did nothing to clarify things. There followed a time during which I continually
received calls from Mr. Shumway and from Jim Goodro, the person in Utah who had
been assigned my accounts for information concerning those accounts. Since I was no
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longer a Franklin Covey Co. employee and worked on straight commission I
requested compensation for any efforts Franklin Covey Co. wanted me to expend and
for the time wasted in traveling to the airport and back in August. Mr. Shumway
refused and accused me of betraying "our friendship."
At that point I consulted my attorney in Maryland. Franklin Covey Co. was informed
of this and asked to deal with my attorney directly. Still calls came to me from Mr.
Shumway until I left him a message directing him to direct all further calls to my
attorney. After prolonged negotiations, I finally received a copy of my personnel file,
which contained several inaccuracies, and compensation allegedly for commissions
earned by me up to including September 12, 1997. (Even the personnel file came
with a cover letter on Franklin Covey Co. letterhead.) In return for the check (from
Franklin Covey Co.) I signed a released which is attached to the plaintiffs motion as
Attachment B. This release was carefully drafted to ensure that I waived none of my
rights except as to the compensation being paid. Franklin Covey Co. withheld sending
me the monies until they received the signed release. Evidently they found it
acceptable at that time because they did send the check.
When I entered into the new employment contract with Franklin Covey Co. in April,
1997 it did contain the sentence "according to Franklin policy, commissions are paid
only for those services delivered while you are employed by Franklin." My
interpretation at the time I signed (which remains the same today) was that Franklin
Covey Co. would act in good faith and not fire me in bad faith. Then, if I chose to
leave Franklin Covey Co. voluntarily I would forfeit my right to receive further
commissions. I knew of no cases where Franklin Covey Co. had fired employees in
the past and believed that the only likely scenario was voluntary departure and parting
of the ways. I never dreamt that I would be led on to produce as much revenue for
Franklin Covey Co. as possible within the confines of the April, 1997, agreement and
then summarily fired in bad faith before I could collect for my effort and hard work.
Franklin Covey Co. did not pay me all of the compensation that it admitted I was due
when I was terminated. It was necessary for me to engage an attorney to try to get
the money that Franklin Covey Co. owed me for sales that were completed before I
left. I chose to negotiate the matter of other commissions separately because I
desparately needed that money and Franklin Covey Co. had shown its willingness to
violate Maryland law, which requires an employer to pay final compensation promptly.
Given the hard time we had collecting the monies due me up to September 12, 1997,
it was clear that Franklin Covey Co. was not willing to do the right thing by me. I
asked my attorney to file suit for the additional compensation. Up to that point any
request for compensation by me, for the wasted day in Boston for example, had been
ignored by Franklin Covey Co. Accordingly my attorney in Maryland drafted a
complaint and informed me that it was his practice to encourage negotiation instead
of litigation. Therefore, he suggested we send the complaint with a letter to Franklin
Covey Co. first and see if matters could be worked out. My attorney sent the letter
on February 5, 1998. We heard no response of any kind from anyone at Franklin
Covey Co. On Saturday February 14, 1998, I was at my home giving a bottle to our
infant son in preparation for his nap. The doorbell rang and I went to answer it
because both my wife and older son were upstairs and could not hear it. At the door
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was a stranger who demanded to know if I was David Melvin. He held up a card
which I could not read and put it immediately back into his pocket. I confirmed that I
was David Melvin and asked him his business. Once again he flashed his card at me,
produced a set of papers,, made a notation on them as to the time and date , handed
them to me and left. His manner was decidedly hostile. The contents turned out to
be a summons to answer to a case filed in Utah state court by a company called
Franklin Covey Client Sales, a company with whom I have had no dealings. I
understand that I could have received this summons by mail, return receipt requested,
or some other method and believe that the plaintiff chose this method as it would
produce the maximum amount of intimidation potential.
32.

The attached documents are true and accurate copies of documents referenced in this
supplemental declaration and elsewhere. Among other things, they establish that my
dealings were with Franklin Covey Co. and that I never entered into an employment
relationship with Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc..
I declare under penalties of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Date:

fi«flw_
David Melvin
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MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW & BEDNAR, LLC
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STEVEN C

BEDNAR

SBEDNAR@MC2B COM

June 30, 1998

Via Facsimile and U.S. Mail
(301) 593-2987
David Melvin
812 Whittington Terrace
Silver Spring, Maryland 20901
Re:

Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. David Melvin
Civil No. 980901616MI

Dear Mr. Melvin:
I have enclosed an original of the written Order containing the rulings made by Judge
Young on June 26, 1998. These have been prepared at Judge Young's instruction. Pursuant to
Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, you have five days to sign this Order
and return it to me or to submit your objections.
Very truly yours,
Manning Curtis Bradshaw & Bednar, LLC

Steven C. Bednar
Attorneys for Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc.
and Franklin Covey Co.
Enclosure
cc: Mark Hessel (w/encs.)
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MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW
& BEDNAR, LLC
Steven C. Bednar #5660
Candice Anderson #7456
370 East South Temple, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801)363-5678
Attorneys for Plaintiff Franklin Covey
Client Sales, Inc.
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

FRANKLIN COVEY CLIENT SALES,
INC., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

ORDER

v.
DAVID MELVIN, an individual,
Defendant.

Civil No. 980901616 MI
Judge David S. Young

Defendant David Melvin's Motion(s) to Dismiss and Plaintiff Franklin Covey Client
Sales, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment came before the Court on July 26, 1998. Steven C.
Bednar appeared on behalf of Plaintiff Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. and on behalf of
Franklin Covey Co.1 Defendant David Melvin did not appear at the hearing. The Court

franklin Covey Co. is not a named party to this action but has previously filed a pleading entitled Consent
to Be Bound By Judgment and Assignment.
#6793
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announced the rulings set forth in this Order based upon the Memoranda submitted by the parties
and without oral argument.
The Court, having read briefs and memoranda submitted by the parties and the
accompanying attachments and having considered the relevant authorities, hereby orders as
follows: Defendant's Motion(s) to Dismiss are hereby DENIED.2 With respect to Plaintiff
Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc.fs Motion for Summary Judgment, there are no genuine issues
of material fact and Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment is therefore GRANTED.
DATED this

day of

, 1998.
BY THE COURT:

David S. Young
Third District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM

David Melvin

2

Defendant David Melvin filed a Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative to Change Venue while this
action was pending in the United States District Court for the District of Utah. Defendant also filed a Motion to
Dismiss after remand to this Court. Both Motions assert a lack of personal jurisdiction which the Court finds
unmeritorious. The Alterative Motion to Transfer Venue raised in Defendant's First Motion to Dismiss became
moot upon remand. Other arguments raised in Defendant's Motion(s) to Dismiss are subsumed in this Court's
ruling on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER to be sent,
via facsimile and U.S. Mail, postage prepaid this
day of June, 1998 to the following:
Mark L. Hessel, Esq.
Suite 307
11501 Georgia Avenue
Wheaton, MD 20902
David Melvin
812 Whittington Terrace
Silver Spring, Maryland 20901
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MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW & BEDNAR, LLC
A

I

F O

R

N

E

I

S

A

1

L

A

W

3 7 0 EAST SOUTH TEMPI E
SUITE 2 0 0
SALT LAKE CITY, U 1 841II

801 3 6 3 - 5 6 7 8
FAX SOI 3 6 4 - 5 6 7 8
S T E V E N C.

BEDNAR

SBEDNAR@MC2B.COM

July 10, 1998

David Melvin
812 Whittington Terrace
Silver Spring, Maryland 20901
R e:

l

<kith i t ,

•

n

No. 98u^u
Dear \ Ir. Melvin:
I enclose mi ; our review and approval as to form a Declaratory Judgment in the abovereferenced matter. This is furnished to you pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration.
Very truly yours,
Manning Curtis Bradshaw & Bednar, LLC

Steven C. Bednar
Attorneys for Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc.
and Franklin Covey Co.
Enclosure
cci Mark L. Hessel, Esq.
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MANNING CURTIS BRADSHAW
& BEDNAR, LLC
Steven C. Bednar #5660
Candice Anderson #7456
370 East South Temple, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-5678
Attorneys for Plaintiff Franklin Covey
Client Sales, Inc.
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

FRANKLIN COVEY CLIENT SALES,
INC., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT

v.
DAVID MELVIN, an individual,
Defendant.

Civil No. 980901616 MI
Judge David S. Young

The Court hereby enters judgment in this Declaratory Judgment Action as follows:
1.

Plaintiff Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. is a "person interested" under the Utah

Declaratory Judgment Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1 et seq. Plaintiff is a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Franklin Covey Co. Franklin Covey Co. has consented to be bound by the
Judgment filed in this action to the same extent as Plaintiff. This Declaratory Judgment is

#6794

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(hereinafter "Franklin Covey,")1
0

The Court hereby declares the rights, status, legal relations and obligations of

Franklin Covey and Defendai it 1\ fel i in at ising fi: oiii Defendant Melvii
Franklin Covey as follows. 11 > Franklin Covey has no contractual, implied or other obligation to
pay Defendant Melvin commissions or any other compensation related to seminars held or future
seminars scheduled to be held or products sold subsequent to the September 12, 1997 effective
date of Defendant Melvin's separation from Franklin Covey; (2) the Release signed by Defendant
hikh in inn No\ ciiilii i I 'i, I 'J1*1 I i. u ii all iLiiiiis n hi led to pa\. .--u

ompensation oi

commissions for services performed by Melvin durn«: H»s employment with Franklin; and {[•)
Frank lin'<- polic\ and practice v\ ith respect to the payment of commissions to separated Account

j.

Hie parties shall each bear their own costs and attorneys1 fees in this action.

DATED this

day of July, 1998.

B\ THE COUR I :

David S. Young
Third District Court Judge

The Court acknowledges that Defendant Melvin contends that his actual employer was Franklin Covey
Co. and not Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. However, the Court finds that it is immaterial whether Defendant
Melvin was employed by Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. or Franklin Covey Co. This action concerns only one
employee, one employer, and only one employment relationship. The relevant terms of Defendant Melvin's
employment relationship are established by an undisputed compensation agreement under which the rights, status,
and legal relations of the parties are hereby determined.
m e t uurt finds that the declaratory relief furnished herein is required under both I Jtah and I\ laryland
law. The Court is therefore not required to determine which law applies to this dispute.
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APPROVED AS TO FORM:

David Melvin
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I hereby certify that i CdUM-u I true and v orrcct cop\ • >i ihu foregoing DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT to be sent, via facsimile and 1' S Mail, postagt prepaid t h i s y ^ ^ day of July, 1998
to the following:
* <<

\

1 . 1 K ISM

M

Mi:ie 307
1 1 ^01 Georgia Avenue
M:) 2CW02

20901
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